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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant ("Respondent") and Appellee ("Petitioner") have presented the issues 
for this appeal in their respective briefs. Petitioner's response, however, raises other 
issues: 
I. Whether Petitioner's admission of error by the trial court should entitle 
Respondent to the relief requested; to wit, remand for the purpose of equally allocating 
a division of marital property and vacating the trial court's award of attorney's fees. 
II. Whether the trial court had sufficient facts to hold that S-Corp. stock was a gift 
to Respondent and not marital property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. Chavez seeks the following relief on this appeal: 
1. An order vacating and remanding the district court's awards which: 
a. Improperly divided a non-existent note receivable from Chavez, 
Inc.; 
b. Improperly ordered Respondent to pay $50,000 to Petitioner for 
alleged dissipation of assets; 
c. Improperly awarded attorney's fees to Petitioner without properly 
evaluating Respondent's ability to pay; 
d. Improperly awarded alimony in amounts not supported by 
evidence; 
e. Improperly divided the marital estate without making sufficient 
findings of fact; 
f. Failed to consider or allocate marital debt; 
g. Failed to award Respondent his non-marital property. 
2. With respect to Petitioner's cross-appeal, Respondent requests affirmance of 
the district court's findings that S-Corp. is not marital property. 
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF CASE 
Petitioner's Statement of Case has added allegations related to the early stages 
of the divorce proceeding which are irrelevant, untrue, and prejudicial, for which 
Petitioner should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
While it is true that Dennis Chavez objected to Tamra's first counsel on the basis 
that his firm had earlier represented Chavez, Inc., that issue is not now before the 
Court. To the extent that allegation was restated to this Court to support Tamra's 
request for attorney's fees, it should be noted that at the time of the filing of the 
Complaint, Tamra withdrew some $5,000 from the parties' joint bank account without 
the knowledge or authority of Dennis, and she had previously had available to her 
approximately $4,500 from another Dean Witter joint account and $3,500 from a 
returned Christmas gift to Dennis. (R. 197.) These amounts were in addition to the 
monthly support voluntarily provided by Dennis. (R. 890, pp. 447-48.) Tamra could 
only account for approximately $2,000 of those cash funds having been paid to her 
previous attorney. (R. 889 at pp. 354-56.) 
There were several attempts to settle this matter which culminated in a 
Settlement Agreement prepared on Tamra's behalf which both parties executed. (R. 
104.) But for the interference of Tamra's boyfriend, also a lawyer, that Settlement 
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Agreement would have resolved all issues between Dennis and Tamra. (Transcript R. 
889 at pp. 254, 256.) 
Petitioner's statement, however, on pages 4 and 5 of her brief, alleging that she 
had executed the Settlement Agreement based upon information "which later turned out 
to be false" is, once again, an untrue and prejudicial allegation which, while fully 
responded to by Dennis in his responding affidavits (R. 193), has never been litigated 
before the trial court. Petitioner's citation to the record cites only her own affidavit 
submitted in support of her motion to set aside the Settlement Agreement. The trial 
court set aside the settlement not on the basis of any alleged improper disclosures, but 
solely on the basis that her counsel had not withdrawn, as she had requested, before 
she executed the stipulation and property settlement agreement. This statement is just 
one of a number of prejudicial, harmful statements designed to mischaracterize Dennis 
in an extremely unfavorable light before this Court. 
There has never been any demonstration that Dennis provided false information 
to Tamra or the Court, as alleged by Petitioner's brief. In fact, Petitioner's brief goes on 
to admit: "The issue of false financial information was not addressed." (Petitioner's 
Brief at 5.) The factually false premise first cited as truth, then withdrawn, leaves a foul 
smell. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties now agree that the trial court erred by finding that a $100,000 note 
receivable from Chavez, Inc. was included as a marital asset. Knowing that this asset 
did not exist, Petitioner's counsel prepared the findings and decree, ensuring that she 
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received her one-half portion of that $100,000 receivable paid now under a different 
theory. In doing so, the Petitioner and the trial court both neglected to subtract from 
Dennis' share of awarded marital property, not only his $50,000 non-existent asset, but 
also the $50,000 judgment which Petitioner claims must be paid. 
That $100,000 negative impact upon Dennis Chavez's share of marital assets 
and his ability to pay attorney's fees, were not considered by the district court. 
Additionally, the trial court failed to make sufficient findings that would justify 
more than the presumptive 50% of marital property being awarded to Tamra. 
The court likewise failed to consider Dennis' tax obligations in determining that 
Dennis had sufficient net income to pay not just alimony and child support, but 
substantial amounts for Tamra's remaining attorney's fees and taxes, all of which were 
speculative and unsupported by evidence in the record. 
Finally, the trial court had sufficient evidence in the record to support its finding 
that S-Corp. stock had been gifted to Dennis and was not marital property. 
CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The following statements from Appellee's Statement of Facts are either 
erroneous, exaggerated, or deceiving for the reasons expressed below: 
1. $100,000 Chavez Loan. In Paragraph A on Page 11, dealing with the 
issues of the $100,000.00 loan from Chavez, Inc., Petitioner states: "and just prior to 
the party's separation, the company paid back the $100,000.00; and it was deposited 
into Dennis' savings account with Bank One. (Exhibit 67)" Respondent adamantly 
disagrees with this statement: 
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First, this statement appears nowhere in the Memorandum Decision, the 
Findings of Fact, the record before this Court, or even the depositions from pretrial 
discovery. 
In referring to the loan, Dennis testified at trial (page 570 of the Transcript, R. 
891):" . . . it was reimbursed over several years." (Page 640 of the Transcript, R. 891): 
"And by the end of 1996 that loan was down to $25,000.00 or had been paid off. One 
or the other? Answer: Yes." 
Dennis then testified that the loan proceeds had been deposited into the parties' 
joint checking account at Dean Witter, not the Bank One account. That Bank One 
account was opened in March 1997, three months after filing of the divorce complaint, 
with proceeds from Dennis's non-marital, S-Corp. dividends. (Deposition of Dennis 
Chavez, p. 87, published at trial, R. 891, p. 624.)1 
In Dennis' deposition, a fuller explanation was given: "Thereafter, then you 
loaned it to the company in the form of $100,000.00 and thereafter it appears that in 
1994 they paid you back $75,000.00 of that." Answer: "I believe so." (Deposition 
Transcript, p. 40 -Addendum). 
At page 41 of Dennis' deposition, he explained what happened to the proceeds: 
At that time, we purchased a home or purchased property in Draper and 
built a home. All the cash that was returned from Chavez, Inc., to me 
went into the purchase of the property and building of a home and 
remains there in equity in the property. 
1
 See Russell v. Thompson Newspapers. Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 899, fn.3 (UT. 
1992) (deposition published at trial available as part of the court record). 
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The $80,000.00 account at Bank One referred to as Exhibit 67 was started after 
March 1997 and was also discussed in Dennis' deposition at page 87: Question: "And 
was that, what was the source of that money?" Answer: "The money that I received 
from dividends that I testified earlier that I transferred from Dean Witter." After which 
Dennis explains virtually every withdrawal from that account. [Addendum - Dennis 
Chavez Depo.] 
Clearly, Petitioner's counsel had all of the above information available to him, not 
only at the time of Dennis' deposition, but also at the time of trial, and should not now 
confuse the reader of this record by insinuating that the money a) had been received 
"just prior" to separation, b) has been unaccounted for, or c) that the $80,000.00 
account contained the same money as was paid back to Dennis from Chavez, Inc. 
2. On page 11 of Tamra's Brief, Paragraph B, Petitioner improperly includes 
argument concerning the receipt of other gross dividends from S Company for the years 
1997, 1998, and 1999, and then, for the first time anywhere, states that the money "was 
likewise unaccounted for." 
This is the first time such an innuendo has been raised and is so prejudicial that 
it should be summarily stricken from Petitioner's brief. Petitioner cites Transcript 637 
for the notion that Dennis failed to account for these monies. Yet on that very page, 
when Respondent attempted to answer that very question, he is summarily cut off by 
Petitioner's counsel because he is "volunteering information." Dennis' response is: 
"You've asked me a question where the money went. I'm trying to give you 
information." Then Petitioner's counsel leaves the subject. 
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3. On page 12, Paragraph C of the Petitioner's Statement of Fact, headed 
"Promissory Note," Petitioner states that Dennis admitted he did not identify the 
promissory note as a marital debt in his Answers to Interrogatories (Transcript 625, 
626). That was the reason that Respondent later submitted a letter of clarification after 
the close of testimony, with the stipulation of Petitioner's counsel, explaining that, at the 
time Petitioner answered the interrogatories, Petitioner believed the promissory note 
had been satisfied by the transfer of S Corp. stock to his father, Tony Chavez. Later, 
Tony Chavez resubmitted the stock, indicating that he did not want to compromise the 
issues of this case or interfere with the divorce proceedings. That clarification was 
allowed to be made by stipulation of Petitioner's counsel, and Petitioner's counsel 
should not now assert claims contrary to this stipulation. (R. 654-56.) (See attachment 
1.) 
4. At page 15, paragraph 3, Petitioner responds with regard to the future 
dividends of S Corp., "that by next year the distributions could be 75% of earnings 
(Transcript 319)." That statement came from Petitioner's counsel's question, not from 
the witness, who answered correctly on the very next page stating: "75% of cash flow, 
not earnings." (T. 320.) That clarification becomes significant as the court found that 
Dennis cannot expect any positive cash flow out of S Company's declared dividends 
and, in fact, will experience a negative cash flow because he must pay taxes upon the 
phantom income reported but not received. See Finding 10b (R. 732): 
The Court further finds that [S Corp.] will not distribute sufficient future 
distributions of cash to permit a positive cash flow over the potential taxes 
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to be imposed upon the full distribution of dividends by reason of its 
Subchapter S federal tax status. [R. 732.] 
See also Finding 11 (R. 736-37). 
ARGUMENT I 
RESPONDENT PROPERLY MARSHALED EVIDENCE. 
Appellee correctly states that the trial court is the appropriate tribunal to weigh 
conflicting facts and to apply the law properly to those found facts. 
Interestingly enough, however, nowhere does the Petitioner now argue that 
Respondent's brief has failed to exhaustively marshal all of the facts which the trial 
court could have used to support its findings, findings which Petitioner now admits are 
not correct and not supported by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT II 
PETITIONER ADMITS ERROR! 
A. Chavez. Inc. Receivable 
Petitioner now admits that the Chavez, Inc. receivable does not exist!2 
Petitioners' admission affects several of the issues raised by Respondent's appeal: (a) 
the effect upon the trial court's proposed distribution of marital assets, which still 
includes the non-existent $100,000 receivable; (b) the effect upon Dennis' ability to pay 
attorney's fees; and (c) the issues related to disproportionate allocation of marital 
assets. 
2
 "Everyone is in agreement that the loan has been repaid." (Petitioner's brief at 
24.) 
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The trial court found in its Memorandum Decision that, amongst the marital 
assets to be divided, was a $100,000 receivable from Chavez, Inc. It divided that 
receivable equally to each party. Respondent argued, and Petitioner now agrees, that 
no such asset exists. 
Petitioner now asserts that Respondent should pay Petitioner's $50,000 share of 
this non-existent asset on a dissipation of asset theory. However, Respondent was 
also awarded $50,000 of a non-existent asset on his side of the marital asset ledger. 
Petitioner now asserts that Respondent is supposed to make payment to Petitioner her 
$50,000. Accordingly, Respondent is doubly harmed by the admitted loss of his 
$50,000 asset and the new responsibility to pay $50,000 to Petitioner. That creates a 
$100,000 negative impact upon the marital assets originally awarded to Dennis by the 
trial court's Memorandum Decision. 
The trial court, at page 17 of its Memorandum Decision (R. 673) and the 
Findings (R. 740), awards Dennis $265,332 of marital assets. Now, however, that 
same asset valuation turns into $165,322 for Dennis while Tamra's share of marital 
property stays at $354,898, almost $200,000 more than Mr. Chavez. 
When the trial court awarded the Petitioner attorney's fees of $38,000, it did so 
when it had assumed that it divided the Chavez, Inc. $100,000 receivable equally 
between the parties. The trial court had not at that time accepted Petitioner's Proposed 
Findings or Decree, so the court could not have considered Dennis' obligation to also 
pay a judgment of $50,000 to Petitioner based upon her added theory (now termed 
dissipation of assets). Nor could the trial court have considered that the $100,000 
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receivable was non-existent. Likewise, the court could not have properly considered 
Respondent's ability to pay a $38,000 attorney fee. These facts alone demonstrate the 
trial court's reliance upon an error of fact, and the insufficiency of the evidence 
considered to award attorney's fees or distribute an unequal division of marital property. 
B. Disproportionate Allocation Of Marital Assets. 
Looking at the effect of this error, and comparing the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision to the Decree of Divorce after Petitioner submitted her version of the Decree, it 
becomes apparent how drastically the error affected Mr. Chavez's award: 
Division of Marital Assets to Dennis Chavez 
Bank One 
Bank One 
Dean Witter IRA 
Astro Van 
1983 Honda 
Motorcycle 
Glass Stream Boat 
Furniture 
Eng. Ring 
Loan to Chavez, Inc. 
Gallagher Debt 
Attorney fee judgment 
Judgment to Tamra 
re Chavez, Inc. 
loan proceeds 
Net 
Memorandum 
Decision 
15,961 
14,018 
163,500 
14,080 
500 
5,800 
295 
7,750 
50,000 
(6,572) 
(38,713.54) 
$226,618.36 
Decree 
15,961 
14,018 
163,500 
14,080 
500 
5,800 
295 
7,750 
50,000 
(6,572) 
(38,713.54) 
(50.000) 
$176,618.36 
Admissions 
On Appeal 
15,961 
14,018 
163,500 
14,080 
500 
5,800 
295 
7,750 
— 
(6,572) 
(38,713.54) 
(50.000) 
$126,618.36 
As demonstrated by the above table, if Dennis were able to liquidate every asset 
he received except the IRA, he would still have to liquidate some $36,881 from that 
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IRA, with its attendant tax and penalties, just to meet the order of the court as it now 
stands. Dennis would be left with an IRA worth approximately $126,000, subject to 
taxes when withdrawn, and no other marital asset. Tamra, on the other hand, receives 
values of some $354,898, together with three-quarters of her attorney's fees obligations 
paid. Her share of marital property now includes virtually all of the equity in the house, 
together with a $50,000 judgment from Dennis. 
This disproportionate treatment has yet to be explained by the Petitioner or by 
the district court, with the exception of the trial court's misreading of Dunn v. Dunn. 802 
P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and an innocuous letter attempting to "save a golden 
goose" which has been specifically found by the court to be Dennis' separate property. 
In reality, Tamra is sharing that separate property in a number of ways: 
a. from dividends received and contributed during the marriage; 
b. from dividends which were never contributed to the marriage, but which 
the court divided without explanation (Bank One account and engagement 
ring); and, 
c. from inclusion of all gross dividends in Dennis' projected income for 
purposes of alimony calculations. 
This is inequitable to Dennis for the reasons expressed here and in Argument V, infra. 
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ARGUMENT III 
DISSIPATION HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED. 
In Parker v. Parker. 996 P.2d 565 (2000), the Utah Court of Appeals noted that, 
"upon a showing of apparent dissipation" the burden will shift unto the custodian of the 
marital funds to demonstrate that it was spent to service or retire marital debt to pay 
taxes for which both parties were responsible, to close the gap between income and 
reasonably living expenses, or for other marital purposes. 
It now appears that neither the trial court nor Petitioner can even identify which 
funds they claim existed after separation, which funds they claim are "unaccounted for," 
or what presumptive evidence demonstrates that dissipation is even an issue. Clearly, 
the trial court's findings are insufficient because they relate to both the $100,000 receipt 
from Chavez, Inc. and the $80,000 Bank One account, about which Dennis has 
answered all questions. Nowhere in the Findings does the Court state that Dennis 
Chavez failed to account for funds or that dissipation of funds is apparent. 
What is apparent is that Petitioner was either purposefully or inadvertently 
confused at trial. That confusion is now being intentionally used to justify a $50,000 
judgment to Tamra Chavez. 
Dennis received from, and then loaned to, Chavez, Inc. $100,000 in 1994 or 
1995. He received payment from Chavez, Inc. in 1995 and 1996, during the marriage. 
It is agreed that these funds were marital in nature. He deposited these funds in joint 
accounts and expended the funds on the building of the parties' home, the purchase of 
furnishings for the house, and other general marital purposes. 
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These transactions were all disclosed in Dennis' production of his Dean Witter 
checking and saving account records, provided to Petitioner before Dennis' deposition. 
Dennis also received dividend distributions from S-Corp., Chavez, Inc., and Del 
Rio Corp., both during the marriage and after separation. Even though he claimed, and 
the court found, these funds to be non-marital, he also provided copies of all receipts, 
all deposits, and all checks written against these funds for the years during marriage 
and the years following separation.3 
In Parker v. Parker, the court found no explanation for "missing sums of nearly 
$100,000 in just six months," including one check for $63,000 where there was 
sufficient monthly income to satisfy the parties' needs. In this case, the parties had all 
receipts and expenditures of the note receivable proceeds during the marriage, most of 
which had been expended by the time of separation on marital assets or obligations. 
This is the only evidence that is before the court, in spite of Petitioner's confusion. 
Petitioner made incorrect assumptions that the $80,000 Bank One account came 
from the $100,000 note receivable proceeds, rather than non-marital dividends 
received. Even if it is assumed, however, that the $80,000 account was derived from 
the $100,000 loan proceeds, then they are already accounted for and have been 
distributed to Petitioner under the Decree of Divorce as follows: 
a. The approximate $16,000 balance divided as marital property; 
b. Repayment of notes to Dennis' father for home improvements; 
3
 Petitioner's assertion that her counsel's testimony acknowledging receipt of 
these documents should be limited to the issue of fees is disingenuous. 
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c. Payments of attorney's fees for both Petitioner's and Respondent's 
counsel; 
d. Purchase of Dennis' engagement ring ($7,500), which the court 
improperly included as marital property. 
As explained by the court of appeals in Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 688 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), because a valuation date is contrary to the general rule that 
marital estates are valued as of the date of trial, the trial court must support an alternate 
valuation date by subsidiary findings. These findings should specify the accounts and 
balances as of the date of separation and at least an initial determination that 
Respondent has failed to demonstrate that such funds were or were not expended for 
marital debt, taxes, or to meet a deficiency of income over expenses. No such findings 
exist in this case. The sole finding is contained in one sentence: 
The court finds that Respondent has had the benefit of the $100,000 loan 
to Chavez, Inc. and that he should be obligated to pay Petitioner $50,000 
as her portion of this asset as reflected in the distribution of assets set 
forth above. (R. 740.) 
Nowhere does the court even suggest that Dennis dissipated the $100,000 asset, or 
that the $100,000 asset exists but was not disclosed. Indeed, all property and all 
accounts have been fully disclosed and divided by this Court and all of it, other than the 
actual stock certificates themselves, has been treated as marital property. Accordingly, 
Tamra has already received her portion of marital property, including whatever may be 
left of deposited funds, whether they were marital or non-marital. 
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ARGUMENT IV 
PETITIONER CANNOT JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE AS A MARITAL DEBT. 
Respondent's principal argument relies on Finlavson v. Finlavson. 874 P.2d 843 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that a divorce court cannot litigate claims 
arising between the divorcing parties and third persons not parties to the divorce action. 
Petitioner completely ignores this argument, which equally applies to the Gallagher 
debt. Instead, Petitioner relies upon a litany of tangential arguments, none of which are 
dispositive of this issue. 
1. Petitioner first argues First Natl Bank v. Egbert. 663 P.2d 85 (Utah 1983), for 
the proposition that all parties must consent to an extended payment of a promissory 
note. In Egbert, however, the obligor was the son and his parents were 
accommodation parties as defined in the U.C.C. Clearly the son was not his parents' 
agent for the purpose of consenting to an extension of the original note, and of course, 
the holding in Egbert was correct in finding that the parents were not obligated under 
the original note. In Egbert, all parties were before the court and the court had full 
jurisdiction to rule. As previously noted, this Court cannot decide legal issues between 
individuals who are not before the Court. 
In this case, Tamra testified that Dennis handled all family and business 
finances. (R. 889, pp. 336-38.) Dennis was, in fact, the agent for his then wife and 
had the right to extend Tamra's joint obligation under the promissory note. She too 
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benefitted from this extension. See Macris v. Sculptured Software. Inc., 24 P.3d 984 
(2001) (husband is wife's agent). 
2. Next, Petitioner chides Dennis for his use of the term "moral" in describing his 
obligation to reimburse his parents. In this sense, Dennis uses that term as a synonym 
for "ethical" or "equitable." A divorce court is a court of equity. Is Dennis not equitably 
compelled to repay a father that gave him a job and career, bailed him (and her) out of 
significant business failures, gifted him stock, and loaned him money for homes and 
home improvements? Could he ever say, "sorry you didn't sue me in time?" Clearly 
Dennis has an ethical, an equitable, and a moral obligation to reimburse his parents for 
a legitimate debt upon which the parties had made partial payment, and which both 
testified would have been due but for a statutory bar. That statutory bar, if there is one, 
should be litigated between the makers and holders of the note. 
Petitioner alludes to the court's reiteration of a suggestion of "mere coincidence, 
a scenario of possible orchestration intimidated by Petitioner." Clearly this statement is 
not a finding of fact. It is not even a suggestion. It simply reflects the Petitioner's 
speculation or intimidation. Nowhere does the court elevate this statement to a finding 
strong enough to divest Petitioner of joint responsibility. In fact, nowhere does the court 
deal with the prospect that Dennis, in equity, must pay that obligation back to his 
parents. 
3. Petitioner then speculates that it would not have been acceptable to Dennis 
for the court to award Tamra sufficient marital assets in order to pay off Dennis' portion 
of that promissory note. In fact, that is exactly what Dennis would agree to, and what 
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should occur. Since Tamra received two-thirds of all marital property and all of the 
value of the home, she should be held responsible for the promissory note which made 
possible the acquisition of that house, the parties5 largest asset. 
4. Petitioner next attempts to escape responsibility by alleging estoppel. 
Estoppel should not apply where Tamra constructively and actually allowed Dennis to 
handle the family and business finances on her behalf. If anything, she should be 
estopped from claiming a statutory bar. 
5. Public Policy: Finally, Petitioner argues that Dennis Chavez must first admit 
the promissory note obligation is a gift if his public policy arguments related to parental 
gifting are credible. Dennis asks the court to view his parents' other gifts to him and to 
his other siblings as being protected by a public policy that encourages these gifts and 
their treatment as non-marital property. At the same time, the trial court should not 
impose a gift that was never intended by his parents to be a gift. Tony Chavez testified 
he attempted to treat his children equally, but not necessarily with the same properties. 
If his estate planning justifies gifts of stock in certain family businesses, it does not 
follow that either parent would necessarily forgive loans evidenced by promissory notes. 
ARGUMENT V 
A DISPROPORTIONATE DIVISION OF 
MARITAL PROPERTY IS NOT JUSTIFIED. 
Petitioner agrees: "there are untold legitimate ways to transfer property to 
children and protect it from a claim of a divorcing spouse." Yet those legitimate 
transfers failed in this case. The trial court recognized the separate gifted character of 
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the donations to Dennis but then takes the value of these gifts away from Dennis and 
the intent of his parents, by using the gifts as a reason to disproportionately divide the 
remaining marital property and by failing to recognize the income received from these 
gifts as Dennis' separate property. These non-marital gifts alone should not be 
considered sufficient to support a disproportionate division of marital property. 
Otherwise, all spouses will have a claim to non-marital property just because of their 
marriage relationship. That was never intended by the court. See Dunn v. Dunn. 802 
P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Petitioner recites the trial court's letter after denying Respondent's request for a 
hearing, saying in effect that the court attempted to preserve the goose that laid the 
golden egg. (R. 702-03.) While it is not clear, the trial judge seems to refer to income 
streams necessary to preserve lifestyles, but specifically refers to Chavez, Inc. 
Curiously, the court had found that Dennis only worked for Chavez, Inc., and that 
Chavez, Inc. is separately controlled by Dennis' father Tony Chavez, and that Dennis' 
ownership interest was a gifted, non-marital property. Now Petitioner justifies the 
court's reasoning that the Petitioner should receive an unequal proportion of marital 
property simply because he sustained the separate character of stock ownership held 
under Dennis' name in the family corporation. This circuitous argument belies common 
sense. The court did not, nor should it have added any gifted stock to the marital 
estate. Petitioner's reliance upon a letter of explanation from the court enforces Dennis' 
argument. The court made no finding, it simply wrote a letter. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND S CORP. 
TO BE NON-MARITAL PROPERTY. 
A. Petitioner's Failure to Marshal Evidence. 
Petitioner has failed in her duty to properly martial the evidence in the record 
which the trial court could have used to support its findings and conclusions that the 
stock of S Corp. was a gift to Dennis not a marital purchase. 
Petitioner says the only evidence which could be used is the testimony of Dennis 
and his father. The Petitioner's brief then refers to page citations in the transcript 
without citing the nature of the testimony given or why it is deemed insufficient to 
support Judge Uno's findings of fact that the stock of S Corp. was gifted to Dennis by 
his parents. 
More importantly, however, Petitioner did not do a very exhaustive search for 
additional evidence in the record or the findings. If the Appellee fails to properly 
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes the record supports the finding. 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Additional evidence 
includes, for example: Tamra's affidavit, signed under oath, states that the stock was 
gifted to Dennis by his father. (Pleadings, R. 173.) Tamra's own testimony that she 
believed it was a gift, but that it was a gift to both parties rather than one party. The 
stock certificate (Ex. 59) evidencing a transfer of this interest to Dennis only. The S 
Company Buy-Sell Agreement (Finding 10b and R. 889, p. 314), which limits holders of 
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S Company stock to original family members, not spouses. The existence of S 
Company stock in other siblings names. (R. 889, pp. 202-03.) 
Petitioner relies upon Dennis' failed attempt to satisfy the joint promissory note to 
his parents by agreeing with his father's demand to transfer the gifted stock in S 
Corporation as full satisfaction for what was owed by the parties under the promissory 
note. While those demands were not written very artfully, and while they may be 
subject to various interpretations, the trial court found, after hearing testimony from 
Tony Chavez and all other parties, the writings were consistent with Tony Chavez's 
testimony and intent. 
The only other piece of evidence is the signed stipulation between the parties 
which Dennis' original counsel prepared without fully understanding the origins of 
Dennis' S Corp. stock holdings. As explained by Dennis at trial, since he was 
attempting to settle this matter and resolve the parties' differences, he did not concern 
himself with correcting characterizations in that stipulation. He was only concerned with 
pursuing the settlement and the entry of an appropriate decree of divorce. The property 
was to have been awarded to him whether it was characterized as marital or non-
marital. Once that settlement was set aside, Dennis quickly let all parties know the true 
nature of his holdings, including a full disclosure of that issue in his deposition. (Dep. 
p. 55.) 
Finally, Petitioner claims that it would be inequitable not to include the value of S 
Corp. in the marital estate. Dennis counters that it is inequitable for the court to have 
recognized all of the prior income stream as his separate property and then divide it 
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without explanation, as though it was marital. Dennis expended much of his dividends 
on marital property and agreed they should be treated as such by the Court. However, 
Dennis treated a great deal as his own property, as the court found, yet the court failed 
to recognize its separate character. Instead, the court included virtually all existing 
accounts and existing properties, other than the specific corporate interests as marital. 
Dennis is now left with gifted interests for which he receives no positive cash flow. The 
inequity, if any, is that Dennis is left with non-producing assets which represent a drain 
to his future income, while the Petitioner has been given a substantially 
disproportionate amount of marital property in consideration of the fact that Dennis was 
awarded assets gifted by his parents that he cannot sell, he cannot reduce to income or 
cash flow, and that represent a current drain on his ability to support himself and his 
family. 
Clearly, Plaintiff has failed in her obligation to exhaustively marshal the evidence, 
and she has failed to demonstrate to the Court why the trial court's reliance upon 
evidence in favor of the trial court's finding on this issue is insufficient or should be 
overturned. 
VII. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED. 
Tamra should not be awarded her fees, either on appeal or at the district court 
level, and the entire question of attorney's fees and costs of court should be remanded 
back to the trial court for further disposition, consistent with the positions taken by 
Respondent in this appeal. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION. 
As stated by Respondent in his original brief, many of the errors alleged to have 
occurred at the trial court level affected a number of Respondent's issues. Now that the 
Petitioner agrees that there was no receivable due from Chavez, Inc., Petitioner will 
also have to agree that an award of one-half of that non-existent asset to Dennis should 
no longer be included in Dennis' share of marital property. Nor should Respondent be 
required to pay Petitioner her portion of the non-existent asset. 
The trial court inequitably divided the marital estate and the debts associated 
with the acquisition of marital property, without making findings sufficient to analyze why 
these amounts are justified. On these issues and the resulting judgments for $50,000 
and for attorney's fees, the findings are neither sufficiently detailed nor include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. 
The issues raised by Appellant should be vacated and remanded to the district court for 
proper consideration. 
DATED this 28T H day of December, 2001. 
By: 
foog^t). SandackVE^i 
Attorney for Respclnde 
jq. 
drf nt/Appellant 
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ROBERT J . MOORE 
HAND DELIVERED 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Senior Third District Court Judge 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Chavez v. Chavez - Civil No. 974900264DA 
Dear Judge Uno: 
During the cross examination of my client, Dennis Chavez, Mr. Dart asked why 
he had not listed the promissory note as an obligation under Interrogatory No. 7 in his 
Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories dated July 2, 1998. 
Mr. Chavez did not have a recollection or reason expressed at that time. As we 
were leaving the courtroom, he realized the reason the promissory note obligation had 
not been listed was because of the contract he had with his father dated April 2, 1997, 
and introduced as Exhibit 65, wherein he had sold back the Swanson stock to his father 
to pay off the note. The Interrogatories were answered on July 2, 1998 and the return 
of the Swanson stock and the reassertion of the promissory note liability did not occur 
until after the letter dated July 17, 1998 from Dennis' father was received. This was 
introduced as Exhibit 66 which did not show the date, however, attached hereto is a 
copy showing that it was signed on July 17, 1998. 
Bert Dart has stipulated that I could send this letter to bring this fact to the court's 
attention. It does not constitute an acknowledgment on his part that the promissory 
note had, in fact, been paid with the sale of the Swanson stock as it is his position that 
the Swanson stock never was sold under the Exhibit 65 agreement and that he 
continued receipt by Dennis of dividends from Swanson during all of 1997 and 1998, as 
evidenced by Exhibit 69, show that Dennis continued to own the stock which could not 
have then been used to pay off the promissory note. 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
July 20, 2000 
Page 2 
This letter has been written with the prior approval and graciousness of Bert Dart 
who stipulated to amend the record for this limited purpose. 
Very truly yours, 
ger D. Sanclack 
RDS/ljc 
cc: B.L. Dart, Esq. 
(via fax) 
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sworn and examined on Wednesday, the 2nd day of June, in 
the year of our Lord 1999, between the hours of 1:00 p.m. 
and 4:20 p.m. of that day, in the small Conference Room of 
the Law Office of B.L. Dart, 310 So. Main Street, Suite 
1330, in the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake and 
State of Utah, before me, Alan P. Smith, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for said 
State of Utah, in a certain cause now pending in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein 
Tamra Anne Chavez is the Petitioner and Dennis M. Chavez 
is the Respondent, on the part of the Petitioner. 
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For the Petitioner: 
For the Respondent: 
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B.L. Dart 
Dart, Adamson, Donovan & 
Hanson 
310 So. Main St., Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Roger Sandack 
170 So. Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Jennifer Olson 
Tamra Anne Chavez 
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385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
1 I involved in the construction business, which would be 
2 1989. 
3 Q Dropping back, there was a distortion there 
4 because of some Nordstrom income apparently of Tamee's of 
5 $387* Chavez, Inc., W-2 was $236,353. 
6 When the company paid you the money back, what 
7 did you do with it? 
8 A I paid taxes on it. 
9 Q And did that use it all or did you still have 
10 some? 
11 A I had some and I loaned it to the company. 
12 Q Thereafter then you loaned it to the company in 
13 the form of $100,000, and thereafter it appears that in 
14 1994 they paid you back $75,000 of that. 
15 A I believe so. 
16 Q Do you know what happened to the $75,000? 
17 A I don't know. 
18 Q And after 1996, the books indicate, don't show 
19 any further payable so I assume that you were paid the 
20 $25,000 as well. 
21 A That is my recollection. 
22 Q And do you know where that $25,000 is? 
23 A I don't. 
24 MR. DART: I'm going to mark these as 
25 J exhibits, and during the recess we will make multiple 
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1 I copies so everybody can have one. Is that all right? 
2 MR. SANDACK: That is fine. In fact why 
3 don't we take a recess now. 
4 MR. DART: That's good. 
5 (Short recess). 
6 (Thereupon deposition Exhibits 
7 11, 12, and 13 were marked for 
8 identification). 
9 MR. DART: Back on the record. 
10 Let me do this first, then you can. We have now 
11 marked Exhibit 11, the 1995 joint individual tax returns 
12 for Dennis and Tamee Chavez that we previously talked to. 
13 We have also marked Exhibit 12, the 1996 year-
14 end Chavez, Inc. balance sheet. I am sorry, they are in 
15 reverse order. That's okay. 
16 Exhibit 13 is the year-end 1995 Chavez, Inc. 
17 balance sheet. 
18 Q (By Mr. Dart) And if you wanted to make some 
19 statement? 
20 A Yes. I need to clarify time has permitted me to 
21 remember a response to your question as to where that 
22 money went to. 
23 At that time we purchased a home or purchased 
24 property in Draper and built a home. All the cash that 
25 I was returned from Chavez, Inc. to me went into the 
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1 purchase of the property and building of a home and 
2 remains now equity in the property. 
3 Q That is the home currently occupied by Tamee? 
4 A Yes. In Draper at 1177 Bear Hollow Circle. 
5 Q Okay. In the documentation which you provided 
6 for us there is a charge card, Visa charge card that is a 
7 Chavez, Inc., card, as I understand it, and it has been 
8 used as I understand by you and these are charges made by 
9 you. 
10 A Yes. May not be completely by me as it is a 
11 corporate card. I give it to some of my employees to 
12 utilize where possible. 
13 Q So this is, there is only one card and you make 
14 it available to other employees? 
15 A No. Some employees have access to a card, 
16 others do not. When they go to pick something up they 
17 tell me, "Hey, give me your Visa card and I will use it." 
18 Q Okay. I am seeing an entry, and I have not made 
19 copies of this, I can if you want, one is to a J.M. Linne 
20 Company for $1,692. Do you know what that is? 
21 A Can I see it, please? 
22 Q Sorry. 
23 A Yes. That is a supplier of vinyl for uniwall 
24 product. 
25 Q There is a Cabo San Lucas, Mexico hotel charge. 
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that. 
MR. SANDACK: — portion. 
MR. DART: I agree. 
MR. SANDACK: So can we keep this portion 
of the deposition confidential — 
MR. DART: Yes. 
MR. SANDACK: — or sealed or however you 
want to handle it. Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Dart) Have they replaced it with 
another product? 
A They have attempted to, yes. 
Q What is your dad's association with Mr. Swanson? 
A A contemporary, very good friend and a business 
partner. 
Q In connection with Swanson. 
A That is correct. 
Q You own stock in Swanson, is that right? 
A I was gifted stock in Swanson. 
Q In some of your pleadings you talk about buying 
stock from Swanson. I guess I need to know exactly what 
happened. When and what happened? 
A Well, my father came to me one day and said, 
"Hank, I and Ashworth and Daws are going to form a 
company. I am going to give you stock in it." 
Q Wasn't the arrangement he was going to sell you 
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No. 
And that was never the arrangement? 
No. 
And were you issued a stock certificate? 
Yes. 
And whose name is that certificate in? 
In Dennis M. Chavez. 
Do you know when that was issued? 
I don't. 
Do you have a copy of that? 
I don't have one in front of me. I have given 
— 
MR. SANDACK: We gave you one. 
MR. DART: Off the record. 
(Off the record). 
MR. DART: Cool. I am glad Jennifer 
here. She just saved thirty minutes. 
Q 
request 
is 
(By Mr. Dart) You produced in response to 
for production a number of documents, and I 
just simply put them together although I don't know 
they coordinate time wise, but I just made a packet 
will go through the packet. 
MR. SANDACK: Twenty. 
have 
that 
and we 
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1 What that was for was my father had allowed us 
2 to make improvements on the home in Dimple Dell, which I 
3 identified in a letter toTamee through her attorney, or 
4 through my attorney to her attorney, indicating there is 
5 an obligation for repairs and build-up and improvements on 
6 the Dimple Dell home in the amount of approximately 
7 $33,000, and I think the balance, or the $35,000 we called 
8 good based on interest. 
9 Q So your attorney was Eph Fankhauser at that time 
10 corresponding with John Anderson at that time. 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And this they send to improvements in Dimple 
13 Dell. Why do you pay your dad back on improvements to 
14 Dimple Dell? 
15 A Because the money, or the resources, the 
16 materials, the labor, were funded by Chavez, Inc., which 
17 was the company he owned at that time. 
18 Q You're telling me that is on top of the loan 
19 that we have been talking about and the interest on that 
20 loan? 
21 A That is correct. And Tamee refused to recognize 
22 that obligation at all. 
23 Q In June of '98 you wrote a check for, 260 to 
24 Lori Christian for $15,000. That is your finance, is that 
25 correct? 
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1 A That is correct. She wasn't at the time. 
2 Q And what was that for? 
3 A That was for costs of living there, vacation she 
4 had paid for. 
5 Q What would — did you arrive at a figure of what 
6 it costs you a month to live there? 
7 A Yeah, we did. Splitting expenses. 
8 Q What was that? 
9 A Approximately $1500. 
10 Q Is it ten months living expenses there? 
11 A Approximately. Less than that. There were some 
12 expenses that she paid for for trips. Things that she had 
13 purchased for my children. 
14 Q Did she give you an accounting of any of that? 
15 A I kept the accounting myself. 
16 Q Do you have that still? 
17 A I don't know if I do. If I do I will produce 
18 it. 
19 Q You have a check, 259, the check before that is 
20 to Roger Sandack, $15,000 retainer. I assume that relates 
21 to this divorce case. 
22 A That is correct. 
23 Q Have you paid him any other fees on this case? 
24 A Not to date. 
25 Q So this account is not a regular checking 
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1 account, but it is just one where the dividends go and 
2 that you made special payments out of? 
3 A Well, that is not entirely true. Since the 
4 beginning of the, since my agreement with Tamee to pay for 
5 various aspects, I have pooled all of my monies and 
6 resources into the account at Bank One, which is a 
7 checking account, 
8 Originally I had two separate accounts at Dean 
9 Witter. One was to keep the dividends separate from the 
10 other, since that was my money. I then transferred money 
11 to Bank One for convenience purposes. 
12 Q And the money you transferred to Bank One is out 
13 of the Dean Witter account. 
14 A That is correct. 
15 Q Was that a joint account with Tamee? 
16 A No, that was a private account. 
17 Q I have gotten confused now. You have an IRA 
18 account at Dean Witter; you have another account at Dean 
19 Witter which we have looked at, which you indicate has a 
20 balance of around $150 or so. Was there a third account? 
21 A Yes, there was. 
22 Q And that account has been closed? 
23 A That account was closed after, after the divorce 
24 proceedings began, because it was a joint account. 
25 Q And the money moved from that Dean Witter 
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1 A That would be Mike's. 
2 Q Mike's jewelry, $7,750. Is that — well, what 
3 is that for? 
4 A Engagement ring. 
5 Q Have you told your children that you are going 
6 to be buying a country club membership for your finance? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Are you going to be doing that? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Have you thought about it or discussed doing 
11 that? 
12 A I don't understand what you mean. 
13 Q So there is not, you're not looking to buy a 
14 country club membership or haven't talked about buying a 
15 country club membership. 
16 A I have one. 
17 MR. SANDACK: Are you talking about the 
18 Salt Lake Country Club, counselor? 
19 THE WITNESS: I don't know what country 
20 club — 
21 MR. DART: No. 
22 Q (By Mr. Dart) The country club membership you 
23 have you tell me is Chavez, Inc., in your name. 
24 A That is correct. 
25 Q Are you contemplating buying another membership 
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anywhere? 
A No. 
Q In addition to this checking account you had a 
savings account, is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And I've got a recap here that has been created. 
I am not going to hold you to the accuracy of it but it 
will save me going through accounts, and if it refreshes 
your memory it will be sufficient. 
MR. SANDACK: This will be Exhibit 33? 
MR. DART: Um-um. 
(Thereupon deposition Exhibit No. 
33 was marked for identification) 
Q (By Mr. Dart) This appeared to have about 
$80,000 in early 1997, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And was that, what was the source of that money? 
A The money that I received from dividends that I 
testified earlier that I transferred from Dean Witter. 
Q And then June you pulled out $10,000, is that 
right? 
A That is correct. 
Q Do you know where that money went? 
A Yeah. That went to a loan to a friend. 
Q Was that friend your fiance? 
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A No. 
i Q Okay. And do you still have a loan receivable 
from that friend? 
A No, that money was put into the Dean Witter 
account to pay for obligations that I had as a result of 
this divorce. 
Q You loaned the money here out of this account, 
when he paid you back you put it in Dean Witter. 
A That is correct. 
Q Was it a one payment back, one $10,000 payment? 
A One $10,000, plus interest. 
Q About how long ago did you receive that, or how 
long was the loan outstanding? 
A I think it was a year loan. 
Q Okay. So probably been the summer of '98 you 
got it back. 
A That is correct. It was prior to my friend 
leaving to go out of town. To move anyway. 
Q And then in June of 1998 you pull out $55,000 
and you put that into the personal account we are talking 
about, is that right? 
A That is correct. To cover the drafts against 
that. 
Q And that would have been your dad's $35,000, 
Roger's $15,000 and about $5,000 for me at that time, is 
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1 that right? 
2 A That is correct. 
3 MR. DART: Thirty three? 
4 THE WITNESS: That is correct. 
5 Q (By Mr. Dart) Do you have any other bank 
6 accounts? 
7 A No. 
8 Q So a total of three Dean Witter, one of which is 
9 closed, two of which are still open, and a savings account 
10 and a checking account. 
11 A Bank One. 
12 Q Or Bank One. 
13 A That is all I have. 
14 Q on interrogatory No. 6 concerning assets owned 
15 by you, there is an objection to the interrogatory, but 
16 then stating that you without objection will attach a list 
17 of assets. We had no attachments. Do you know whether 
18 there was an attachment at that time? 
-I9 I will take an answer from anybody. 
20 MR. SANDACK: I don't have my file with me. 
21 I will have to take a look and see. 
22 MR. DART: We got no attachments to this, 
23 so we would request the attachment referenced in answer to 
24 No. 6 . 
25 MR. SANDACK: Okay. 
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